Roger Crisp presents a comprehensive study of Henry Sidgwick's The Methods of Ethics, a landmark work first published in 1874. Crisp argues that Sidgwick is largely right about central issues in moral philosophy: the metaphysics and epistemology of ethics, consequentialism, hedonism about well-being, and the weight to be given to self-interest. The career of Oxford philosopher Roger Crisp has produced a wonderfully rich yield of elegant, lucid philosophizing that combines in a rare mix historical erudition and brilliant, creative, and highly interdisciplinary ethical argument ... The subtlety and boldness of Crisp's defense of Sidgwick's better hedonistic angels is matched only by his similar sympathetic re-envisionings of Sidgwick's use of the term 'reasons,' dualism of practical reason, and potential for a makeover allowing for the insights of Ross on prima facie duties. Sidgwick could not have asked for a better tribute.