This volume investigates the neglected topic of mental action, and shows its importance for the metaphysics, epistemology, and phenomenology of mind. Twelve specially written essays address such questions as the following: Which phenomena should we count as mental actions -- imagining, remembering, judging, for instance? How should we explain our knowledge of our mental actions, and what light does that throw on self-knowledge in general? What contributions do mental actions make to our consciousness? What is the relationship between the voluntary and the active, in the mental sphere? What are the similarities and differences between mental and physical action, and what can we learn about each from the other? Even if the highly readable volume will not offer satisfying answers to all questions about mental agency, it certainly succeeds in this self-set task. In fact, its contributions nicely demonstrate why mental agency is both one of the most intriguing and one of the most puzzling topics in philosophy of action. ... Overall, philosophers interested in the topic of mental agency will find this book highly rewarding and interesting - and not merely because there are few other collections around which try to cover the topic in its generality in the current philosophical discussion. For not only do the different contributions combine to give a valuable overview of the current state of play, but, at the same time, Soteriou's introduction provides an excellent starting point for the reader who is less familiar with the discussion.