Joseph Raz offers an explanation of the normativity of rules, promises, decisions, and orders, of games, and of the law, using an analysis of a special type of reasons, i.e. reasons to exclude other reasons, providing an account of the systematic interdependence of rules in legal and other systems, and an account of types of normative discourse.

In what way are rules normative, and how do they differ from ordinary reasons? What makes normative systems systematic? What distinguishes legal systems, and in what consists their normativity? Joseph Raz answers these three questions by taking reasons as the basic normative concept, and showing the distinctive role reasons have in every case, thus paving the way to a unified account of normativity.

Any serious reader should recognize the volume's rigor, sophistication, subtlety, and admirable ambitious sweep. It remains Raz's most impressive achievement ... the republication of Practical Reason and Norms ... is a welcome event. Anyone interested in legal or moral philosophy ... would be advised to pursue it.