The first book to put the Sino-Indian border dispute and the 1962 war into its rightful historical and geopolitical context, China's India War examines how the 1962 war was about much more than the border. China was going through immense internal turmoil following the disastrous 'Great Leap Forward' and Mao Zedong, the architect of the movement, was looking to reassert his power over the Communist Party and the People's Liberation Army. Finding an outside enemy against which everyone could unite was his best option. Coincidentally, India was emerging as the leader of the newly independent countries in Asia and Africa and the stakes were high for a war with India: winning the war could mean China would 'dethrone' India and take over. A border dispute with India and India's decision to grant asylum to the Dalal Lama after a failed uprising against Chinese rule in Tibet in 1959 gave China legitimate reasons to go to war. This book unveils how China has started planning the war as early as in 1959, much before Jawaharlal Nehru launched the 'forward policy' in the border areas. And how the war accomplished much for China: India lost, China became the main voice of revolutionary movements in the Third World, and Mao Zedong was back in power.

The 1962 war between India and China was not about a disputed border. It was the result of China's desire to become the leader of the 'Third World' - and, at a time when China was barely recovering from the disastrous Great Leap Forward and its architect, Mao Zedong, was discredited, to unite different factions within the Chinese leadership against an outside enemy: India. China won the war, became the main voice of revolutionary movements in the Third World-and Mao Zedong was back in power.

Chinas India War is well-written and challenges dominant views in the historiography on the Sino-Indian border conflict. Its arguments are evocative and provocative.