Can we ever achieve belief by a direct act of will? If it will help us to be happier, should we make ourselves believe propositions which the evidence alone does not warrant? These are the sort of questions which Professor Pojman examines in Religious Belief and the Will (originally published in 1986).

Can we ever achieve belief by a direct act of will? If it will help us to be happier, should we make ourselves believe propositions which the evidence alone does not warrant? These are the sort of questions which Professor Pojman examines in Religious Belief and the Will (originally published in 1986). He deals with a constellation of problems related to believing and willing to believe; his main concern is with religious faith and belief, though his analysis is also of interest to epistemology and ethics.

Pojman asks what is so important about believing propositions in the first place, and why religious creeds have made propositional belief a necessary condition for salvation. He considers whether one can be rational and still use the will to believe what the evidence alone does not warrant. He also discusses whether faith and belief are generically related or distinct attitudes.

This is the first full-length treatise on religious belief that approaches the subject from the viewpoint of volitional activity (i.e., related to the will). It presents a rethinking of the way the will interacts with belief, a relationship often misconstrued in works of philosophy and theology. Pojman believes that the will is central to religious commitment, and that by understanding the relationship between the attitude of belief and the activity of willing, we are enabled to get fresh insight into the classical problem of religious belief and the will.