The concept of humility has venerable philosophical roots. For instance, Socrates' unparalleled wisdom is exhibited primarily through the recognition of his own ignorance-that is, through his epistemic humility. Humility, whether understood epistemically or morally, has been widely regarded as an important virtue across various philosophical traditions. However, not all scholars and philosophers agree that humility is virtuous, or even that it is a sign of wisdom. Some instead assert that humility involves a misjudgement or an underestimation of oneself, even claiming it impedes the pursuit of excellence. In a timely, pioneering collection of chapters and reflections, Humility: A History examines the shifting conceptions and appraisals of humility across philosophical history from Plato to present-day. The essays in this volume examine important questions about humility: Is it a virtue? If yes, is it moral, epistemic, or both? How does it relate to modesty and shame? Is it paradoxical to ascribe humility to oneself, and if so, why? What is its role in politics, culture, and contemporary society?